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11.12.07
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A Controlled Liberal?
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By Dmitry Babich
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Deciphering the Inner Workings of Dmitry Medvedev
On Tuesday, Dmitry Medvedev, who formally remains just a potential candidate for Russia’s presidency, said he would like to see Vladimir Putin as the country’s prime minister in a Medvedev administration.
With this suggestion, Medvedev, whose candidacy was backed by four Russian parties, including the pro-Kremlin United Russia and Just Russia, shows his willingness to be a “team player.” However, Putin’s appointment does not necessarily make Medvedev a dependent figure. According to the Russian Constitution, the president not only appoints the prime minister, but also has a direct influence over the choice of key government ministers. The changes to Russian law made by Putin between 2004 and 2007 give the president the power to appoint regional governors, among other things. Nevertheless, with the support of two-thirds of the State Duma, Putin and his party, United Russia, will have more influence on the president’s decisions than any previous parliament in Russia’s history. A simple majority in the Duma is enough to gain a vote of no-confidence in the government. After two such votes, the president will have to either dismiss the government or dissolve the Duma. During President Boris Yeltsin’s tenure, Duma passed votes of no confidence in the government many times, but it never brought the situation to the point where there was risk of Yeltsin dissolving the legislature. This time, however, Putin and United Russia will also have the power to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president, and the Duma cannot be dismissed during impeachment proceedings.
However, Medvedev’s very personality makes any confrontation scenarios unlikely. Speaking to reporters at one of his recent press briefings, Medvedev dropped a very meaningful phrase while answering one more question about his presidential ambitions: “I am a part of the state machine.” Some might view this as a sign of a lack of character. But others might view it as an honest acknowledgment of a man who does not want to pretend to be something he is not. “Dmitry Medvedev was the most unremarkable figure in the struggle for power,” the newspaper Kommersant wrote in its story on Medvedev’s nomination, obviously preferring the first interpretation.
Actions speak louder than words
And it is true that Medvedev did not play an obvious role in any of the high-profile scandals between 2001 and 2007 when he became one of the key figures in Russia’s state machine. Medvedev was not visible among the most active participants in the break-up of Yukos assets. Nor did Medvedev call for the expulsion of controversial media tycoons Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky. However, he was the chairman of Gazprom’s board of directors when Gazprom Media took possession of the most precious jewel in Gusinsky’s media crown – the NTV television channel. It is also important to remember that under Medevedev’s management, Gazprom considered a merger with Rosneft, a company that bought most of Yukos’s assets in an auction arranged by the state as a way for Yukos to pay its tax bill. However, Medvedev never made aggressive statements against Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky and other disgruntled oligarchs, insisting only on the “legally effective” methods of getting the unpaid taxes from them.
In the position of first deputy prime minister, which he has held since November 2005, Medvedev supervised a number of important policy decisions in addition to the four much-publicized national projects, for which he managed to squeeze out of the state budget 110 billion rubles in 2006 ($4.4 billion) and 260 billion rubles ($10.4 billion) in 2007. His sphere of responsibility included migration policy, where an important liberalization of registration rules has taken place over the past year. Medvedev was also charged with removing bureaucratic obstacles to mass construction, simplifying the procedures of land distribution. In both of these areas, Russia still faces major problems and complaints are often heard about the unnecessary complications in obtaining registration permits and in getting land for housing. However, as many of Russia’s regions are experiencing a construction boom in which the foreign labor force plays an important role, a liberal approach seems to be getting the upper hand under Medvedev. However, as Kommersant noted, Medvedev never publicized his role in these developments.
A team player
Medvedev has been traditionally secretive about his team, which is common in Russian politics. Vladimir Putin also had less freedom in making his personnel choices until after his second election in March 2004.
Kommersant expects that Medvedev’s presidential power will be somewhat offset by a strong prime minister – Vladimir Putin himself. In the present cabinet, Medvedev is rumored to have the support of the new minister of trade and economic development, Elvira Nabiullina and the minister of regional development, Dmitry Kozak. Putin’s economic adviser Igor Shuvalov and Arkady Dvorkovich, head of the presidential expert council are also seen as being close to Medvedev.
All of these people are seen as moderate economic liberals, advocating market principles in resolving Russia’s social issues. However, the counterweight of the prime minister is likely to limit Medvedev’s freedom in choosing his cabinent. Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia’s prime minister until 2004, played the same role during Putin’s early years in power, representing the interests of Yeltsin’s oligarchic surrounding (the so-called Family) in Putin’s administration.
Another man from St. Petersburg
Medvedev’s life can be divided into two parts: the St. Petersburg period, which was mostly unremarkable, and the Moscow period, in which Medvedev suddenly rocketed to the upper echelons of Russia’s government and economy. The son of a university professor in the most cultured of Russia’s cities, Medvedev owed most of his career to successful and influential patrons. In 1989, two years after graduating from the law department of Leningrad State University, he worked in the campaign headquarters of his former professor, Anatoly Sobchak. After winning a seat in the Soviet parliament, Sobchak became one of the leaders of democratic opposition to the Mikhail Gorbachev and was later elected the mayor of St. Petersburg.
This connection can, in a way, be seen as a proof of Medvedev’s democratic credentials. However, Medvedev cannot be called an idealistic democrat; he never defended any “hopeless” causes and always behaved responsibly within the system. In 1996, when Sobchak lost the mayoral election to Vladimir Yakovlev, Medvedev returned to his academic work at St. Petersburg State University, leaving the mayor’s office with the rest of Sobchak’s cohort, including Vladimir Putin. In 1994, Medvedev began working as a legal adviser for the Ilim Pulp Company, gaining the experience with corporate securities – experience that proved to be especially valuable after Putin’s became the acting prime minister in summer 1999. After working for a year under the Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak and later in the presidential administration, Medvedev became the chairman of Gazprom’s board of directors in 2000. With the exception of a short break between 2001 and 2002, he held on to this position. Under Medvedev’s stewardship, Gazprom’s stock was liberalized – but only after the state got a controlling stake in it.
This is characteristic of Medvedev’s policy style in general, which can be summed up as a kind of controlled liberalism, getting the state involved only in cases when the problem is too big for non-state actors, as with some social issues, or when there is a risk of the country losing control over strategic branches of the economy.
Judging by Medvedev’s own statements, he does not mind being a part of the state machine. In fact, he seems to prefer the role of a quiet, humane bureaucrat to the one of a more public Russian politician – a noisy, frequently misbehaving “man of the people,” always improvising in a bid to play up to the audience in the crudest possible way. In fact, the two most successful Russian populists of the last 20 years – Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Zhirinovsky – embodied this archetype, which seems to have exhausted its potential by 2000.
At a recent meeting with journalists, Medvedev lambasted this type of public policy, which dominated during the 1990s:
“I was disgusted by what was happening in our politics 15 years ago,” he said. “These improvising characters, who replaced each other in a kaleidoscopic way, these fistfights in the Duma – all of that was not a sign of democracy, but a sign of the low political culture of the population. Now we often still lack the feeling of taste and measure. But the political culture of the population is still higher than it was in the 1990s.”
However, in several of his statements Medvedev stressed that Russia can’t do without democracy, noting that “no undemocratic state so far has become a prosperous one.” In a recent conversation with journalists, Medvedev defended a strong executive branch, along with an increasing role for the parliament, which needs to include representatives of “large established parties.” This seems to be Putin’s idea as well. |
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