|
|
|
|
|
|
03.08.07
|
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Teaching Russia’s History
|
|
|
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
|
Contributors: Ethan S. Burger, Stephen Blank, Andrei Lebedev
It has long been a truism of sorts that Russia is a country with an unpredictable past.
Successive political regimes in Russia – from the tsars to general secretaries and presidents – have been quite keen on promoting a version of the country’s history that most suited their political objectives and legitimized their political regimes. From Boris Godunov to Peter the Great and Catherine the Great the tsars did not hesitate to meddle in writing history, even commissioning large-scale historical studies like the History of the Russian State by Ivan Karamzin. All featured creative interpretations and arbitrarily selective use of historical facts.
The Communists were particularly keen on re-writing Russia’s history and borrowing only those “facts” that could justify the underlying principal of the Communist doctrine – a perpetual class struggle in which the downtrodden classes must overthrow their oppressors. Joseph Stalin went as far as personally editing a history course (that dealt mostly with the history of the revolution and the party) to make sure that it reflected his central role in the October revolution, and diminished the contribution of other revolutionary leaders, such as Stalin’s enemy number one – Leon Trotsky.
There is now another bout of speculation about official versions of Russia’s modern history, triggered by the publication of a manual for history teachers under the auspices of the Kremlin, promoted by Vladislav Surkov and even President Vladimir Putin himself. Both Putin and Surkov spoke publicly about the need to provide schools and universities with history textbooks that would present a balanced and respectful interpretation of the country’s past, rather than the more popular view of the early 1990s, denigrating Russia as a historic villain meant to be enlightened by the West.
The new manual resulted in enormous public controversy in Russia, with members of the academic community complaining that it was written by the Kremlin’s political consultants – people not qualified enough to write history books. The two authors of the manual repudiated their authorship, and media speculated that the text would be used as the only officially approved history textbook, since it contained a hagiographic final chapter on Putin’s rule and on Surkov’s concept of “sovereign democracy”.
Western media were quick to pick up the story as another example of Russia’s roll-back from democracy under Putin.
Does the Kremlin truly need to impose an interpretation of Russia’s history that would support its efforts to centralize power and modernize the country from the top down? Or is it perhaps a well-intentioned attempt by Putin and Surkov to provide an alternative look at the country’s past, which would not denigrate but instead instill pride and confidence in the idea of being Russian? Is the regime actually moving in the same paranoid direction the Soviets chose 70 years ago, or is it just an innocent exercise in a fair battle of ideas, where nothing gets imposed and different views compete? What does this development signify about Russia’s overall historic trajectory? For this, we ask our experts panel.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow
History is one of the most ideologically loaded branches of social science – no doubt about that. By definition, it cannot be anything but a subjective interpretation of facts. Without the latter, history is degraded to a “fact book” even more vulnerable to highly pectoral arrangements of events, interpretations and facts.
Of course, this interpretation has to fit with the Procrustean bed of logic and laws of history. No interpreter (historian) should play the risky game of applying a subjunctive mood to past events. It is prohibited to argue, for example, that “had the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement not been reached, the fate of Eastern Poland would have been…” (one may end the assortment in different ways).
State authorities do not often intervene in specific fields of science. Russia is an exception. This says more about the poor state of Russian social science (after decades of free thought suppression) rather than about the historic trajectory of the country. No textbook written since 1991 offers a comparatively balanced view of Russian history, and the situation demands redress. It could and should have been corrected, though, by conducting an open contest for the best history textbook. Otherwise, even the most balanced book is at risk of being criticized for “one-sidedness”, and the motives of its sponsors are open to question.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ethan S. Burger, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University & Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.
Perhaps within a decade or so, the Internet will make the entire idea of traditional textbooks obsolete. If it is true that “history is a lie agreed upon” (a quote often attributed to Napoleon), then those exercising political power are likely to attempt to produce history texts which fit their current needs, but how can they possibly succeed? Deciding what subjects to teach during history class is not such a straightforward process – it must be consistent with the students’ age and it is likely to change over time.
The issue of Russian history textbook content will need to be addressed in the near future. Many academics value intellectual honesty, but whether they can prevail in having such candor reflected in course syllabi and textbooks, given the political status quo, is uncertain.
Sergei Mironov's recent comment on his anticipation of the Federal Assembly’s decision to modify the Russian Constitution thereby permitting President Putin to return to power in 2012 is a useful illustration. It has become more difficult to instill in students an appreciation of the importance of the rule of law, and to introduce them to a large number of relevant political theorists.
Russian students today, unlike Soviet students in the past, have access to non-state controlled sources of information through the Internet. In addition, they may have access to books published during Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s terms, as well as to foreign books. It may not be possible to put the genie back in the bottle.
I think that in the upper grades, it will be impossible to teach Russian and world history to Russian students following a single approved script. History is too complex a topic. Russian history cannot be taught independently from civics, as state schools glossing over many topics would lend no credence. What role will the ethnic/national composition of the country play?
Allow me to name a few subjects that are likely to deserve great intellectual interest on behalf of students (and their parents) as well as trigger debate:
(i) How did the Russian autocracy function? What rights did individuals enjoy? What was the role of the Orthodox Church in the country? To what extent did Russia participate in the European enlightenment and what were the consequences? Why did many of Russia's rulers come from German states? Did this have an impact on the rulers' attitude towards the people?
(ii) What were Russia's foreign policy goals in the post-Napoleonic era? During this period, why did Russia lag behind the major powers in Europe economically? How did Russia "settle" the traditionally non-Russian lands east of the Ural Mountains (including Central Asia) and the Caucasus? What were the attitudes of the local population towards Russian rule? What role did Russian nationalism play in the country's political culture?
(iii) Why did Russia not evolve into a constitutional monarchy as envisioned by Alexander II along the lines of Great Britain, or into a Republic such as France? In the 1880s, until the Russo-Japanese War, Russian cultural and economic life flourished. What factors contributed to this?
(iv) Did the weakness of the Russian state contribute to its overthrow during World War I? What factors contributed to the Bolshevik's success in 1917? What impact did Stalin have on the development of the country's economy, military capability and social norms? What people suffered most under Soviet rule? Who benefited?
(v) What factors contributed to the setbacks at the outset of the Great Patriotic War? Was the Cold War inevitable? What factors lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union? What groups had the most difficult time living in Post-Soviet Russia? Which groups had the easiest? Can Russia function effectively as a federated state, or must power be centralized in Moscow? What are the strengths of the Russian Constitution and what are its weaknesses? What role should the state play in cultural matters? Should media be in private hands or should the state have a monopoly?
(vi) What should Russian foreign policy be towards the states in Central and Eastern Europe, the other successor states of the Soviet Union, the European Union, the United States, China and India?
There are no simple answers to these questions. Any attempt to force a single set of answers on the population will certainly produce unforeseen and in all likelihood undesirable consequences. The study of history is a complex endeavor where one's perspective is strongly influenced by the present.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professor Stephen Blank, The US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
(Dr. Blank’s views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government)
The struggle over history textbooks is both sad and enlightening. It is upsetting because it demonstrates that the regime is, as many of us have noted, regressing steadily towards a mixture of Tsarist and Soviet models with a state-sanctioned interpretation of history. This is saddening for many reasons. First it shows that the regime is, for all its boasting, deeply fearful of freedom and of the capability of men and women to think for themselves. Secondly, it betrays a lust for power that, if unchecked, could approach a totalitarian model of an official ideology incessantly trumpeted by state media combined with the repression of those who think differently.
But this is likewise enlightening because it confirms a regressiveness and lack of moral confrontation with Russia's past that must be overcome if Russia is to be a truly great state, rather than a power masquerading as one. This refusal to face the truth exacerbates Russia's estrangement from Europe, where the struggle to reclaim an accurate historical memory, particularly about the 20th century, is acute (one need only read Tony Judt's marvelous book “Postwar” to perceive this). As long as Russia is unwilling to face its history, it will also be, in some sense, a threat to its neighbors, as the Baltic struggle indicates, and potentially vulnerable to a new authoritarian ideology.
This episode illustrates for us the ways in which Putin, like Nicholas I, is trying to impose an official doctrine of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality (in this case state nationalism) on Russia. The linked cults of autocracy, i.e., Putin, orthodoxy meaning subjecting the church to the state once again, and the cult of Russia as a great power exaggerating Russia's true capabilities, can only lead to a dead end. In many respects, and to borrow Levi-Strauss' term, Russia remains a “frozen culture,” at least in its official political state. Its elites seem unable to break out of this magic circle. The arguments they use to justify their power are the same as the ones used since Catherine's time.
Surkov's and Putin's recourse to this ersatz ideology of official nationality with Slavophilic resonance and Soviet chauvinism hardly constitutes a recipe for the 21st century, and only estranges Russia's neighbors and interlocutors. These machinations are merely a repeat of past failures and validate Marx's observations that history repeats itself the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. Once Putin leaves the scene and a new successor comes in, having to resort to his own cult of personality and official ideology to justify his policies and undo Putin's, this will be exposed for the farcical and misconceived charade that it is. And in this respect, this aspect of Putin's rule may well come to be remembered by historians as was Nicholas I's reign, for in its aftermath, one historian observed that the worst thing is that the whole thing was a mistake. |
| The source |
|
|
|
|
|
|
The virtual community for English-speaking expats and Russians
